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Introduction
This paper uses a linked employer-employee dataset to analyse the impact of institutional wage bargaining arrangements on levels of average labour costs and within firm wage dispersion in private sector corporations in Ireland. Average labour costs are taken as a proxy measure for firm-level competitiveness, while dispersion measures the extent of wage inequality within the firm. Average labour costs can be thought of as a health measure relating to both the firm and, by extension, the wider economy, while dispersion relates more closely to employee wellbeing and, more particularly, the relative position of low paid workers in firms operating within one of the fastest growing OECD economies.
It is important to note that the questions addressed here go beyond that of the impacts of trade union membership on firm-level performance and inequality as, due the nature of wage bargaining arrangements in Ireland, and continental Europe more generally, the proportion of workers covered by collective bargaining regimes far exceeds the proportion who are members of trade unions (Hartog, 2002) . While collective wage bargaining processes will be the primary channel through which trade unions impact wage levels, this is not to say that there are no additional influences deriving from firm trade union density. However, within a multivariate framework these additional influences can be thought off as separate to those derived from the wage bargaining process itself. This paper adds to the limited literature in this area by considering theses issues within an Irish context. The study also provides some assessment of the extent to which the impact of wage bargaining regimes differs across privately-owned indigenous firms and multinational companies (MNC's).
Context and Literature
Since 1987, wage bargaining in Ireland has been centralised at the national level, through a process known as Social Partnership. This partnership approach, which involves voluntary negotiations between the Government, main employer bodies and trade unions 1 , was introduced by the Government at this time to assist it in moving the country out of the bleak economic situation that it found itself in; a period characterised by high inflation, weak economic growth and, subsequently, considerable unemployment, mass emigration and unsustainable government borrowing and national debt 2 . There have been nine agreements to-date 3 , each of which has been tailored to medium term national economic and social needs, and has often built on its predecessor. Initially, pay and wage issues were the core elements of the negotiated agreements; specifically moderate wage increases in exchange for reductions in income tax to boost take-home pay. However, as the country recovered and moved into the 'Celtic Tiger' era, the partnership nature of the agreements became deeper and their coverage was extended to include various social and welfare issues that either emerged or become more prominent as the economy prospered.
The national pay agreements that have been negotiated through Social Partnership have been identified in a number of studies (Sexton & O'Connell (1996) , Lane (1998) , Sweeney (1998) , Aust (1999) , O'Donnell (1999) , Hardiman (2000) , Teague & Donaghey (2004) , Baccaro & Simoni (2007) , O'Donnell (2008) ) as having played an important role in the remarkable revival in the Irish economy that has taken place in the last two decades 4 . In particular, most of this research indicates that the wage restraint attained under the pay agreements enhanced the country's competitiveness, through lower labour costs, and this consequently led to both significant employment and economic growth. In 1996 the Government extended the list of social partners eligible to participate in the negotiation of national agreements to include various voluntary and community groups. 2 Ireland had one of the highest budgetary deficits in the European Community (EC) in 1987, 10.7 per cent of Gross National Product (GNP). In addition, it had a national debt in excess of 120% of GNP, an unemployment rate of 18.5 per cent, net emigration close to 30,000 (which was equivalent to the natural increase in the population at this time), GDP per capita that was only 64 per cent of the EC average and very high interest rates (Department of the Taoiseach, 1987) . 3 The most recent was agreed in October-November 2008. 4 In the Netherlands, a form of corporatism, similar to Ireland's Social Partnership model, has been identified with having contributed significantly to the 'Dutch Miracle' (Visser & Hermerijck, 1997; Visser, 1998 Barry et al. (1999 ) and OECD (1999 , 2008 ), and it continues to be a significant contributor to the economy's performance through both output and employment. While the literature has alluded to the benefits of Social Partnership in Ireland's recent economic success, specifically through the national wage agreement (NWA) component of the process, due mainly to a lack of data, there appears to be no previous empirical analysis of its direct impact on Ireland's competitiveness 7 .
5 The term MNC's and FDI are used interchangeably throughout the paper. 6 This employment data came from the Census of Industrial Production (CIP), which is produced by the Central Statistics Office (CSO), and 2005 is the most recent year for which data is available. Unfortunately, we do not have data from this source on nationality of ownership for the services sector. However, data available from Forfás (Ireland's national policy and advisory board for enterprise, trade, science, technology and innovation) indicates that the number of individuals employed in FDI-owned services companies increased from 2,945 in 1986 to 153,508 in 2007, a growth of 52 per cent (Forfás, 1995 (Forfás, , 2007 . This data, however, only relates to FDI firms that received government support and, therefore, will underestimate the total. 7 Fitzgerald (1999 Fitzgerald ( , 2000 , however, looked at wage formation in Ireland between 1962 and 1994, using national aggregate data, and concluded that the slow down in real wage growth observed after 1980 was due to "market forces" as opposed to centralised wage bargaining. He argued instead that the main contribution of Social Partnership to Ireland's economic turnaround has been in bringing about However, there are grounds to believe that Social Partnership will lead to lower labour costs, particularly for MNC's. Leahy & Montagna (2000) develop a theoretical framework which predicts that MNC's may prefer to locate in countries with centralised bargaining, due to the gain in competitiveness associated with wage setting aimed at securing the interests of domestic firms. In the model, unions will choose to limit the rent extracted from the MNC in order to preserve employment levels in the less competitive domestic firms. Leahy & Montagna (2000) Barrett et al. (2002) demonstrated that wage inequality stabilised in the mid-1990s, a result they attributed in part to a marked increase in high-skilled inward migration. More recently, McGuinness et al. (2009) found that wage inequality fell for Irish men between 1994
industrial peace as opposed to moderating wage increases, and hence improving the country's competitiveness (see also Bradley et al., 1991 From a wider international perspective, while there is a great deal of literature relating to trade union effects on earnings, both in the context of a wage premium (Freeman & Medoff (1981) , Lewis (1986) , Stewart (1987) , Schumacher (1999) , Forth & Millward (2002) ) and wage dispersion (Freeman (1982) , Blau & Kahn (1996 ) DiNardo et al. (1996 , Card et al. (2003) , Dustmann & Schönberg (2004) ), much less is known with respect to the impact of bargaining regimes on firm-level wage dispersion and even less on measures of firm competitiveness 9 . Existing evidence is mostly restricted to European countries, presumably due both to the absence of such institutional arrangements elsewhere in the world and/or a lack of available data. Regarding wage inequality, for Germany, found, for blue collar workers, lower levels of dispersion in firms implementing industry-level agreements 10 , while Kohn & Lembake (2007) reported that industry and firm-level bargaining resulted in lower levels of wage dispersion relative to individual-level bargaining. Domínguez et al. (2004) found that firm-level agreements had a negative impact on firm-level wage dispersion in Spain compared to industry-level agreements. Finally, Plasman et al. (2007) , who examined bargaining regimes in Belgium, Demark and Spain, reported higher (lower) levels of wage inequality associated with firm-level bargaining in Belgium and Denmark (Spain), and argued that this disparity in results may be accounted for by cross-country variations in the goals of trade unions.
Turning to the impact of bargaining regime on average labour costs, Kohn & Lembake (2007) found higher average wages in German firms implementing both firm and industry-level agreements. Again for Germany, Guertzgen (2006) compared 9 There is also an extensive body of research that looks at the impact of collective bargaining regimes on macroeconomic performance indicators. Aidt & Tzannatos (2008) provide a recent systematic review of the empirical research in this area, along with the relevant theoretical literature. 10 See also . 
Data and Methods
The data used in this study comes from the 2003 National Employment Survey (NES). The 2003 NES is a matched employer-employee workplace survey, covering both the public and private sectors, which was carried out by the Irish Central Statistics Office (CSO) 11 . The employer sample was drawn from the CSO's Central Business Register. Selected firms were then asked to extract a systematic sample of employees from their payrolls. Approximately 6,500 private sector employers and 300 public sector bodies were surveyed across the economy. Within this, a total sample of 60,000 employees were included from the private sector and 29,000 from the public sector. In total 54,000 returns were received.
The employer questionnaire requested information on employee earnings 12 , hour's worked and occupation. Information was also obtained on ownership type 13 , firm size, industry, use of pay agreements, percentage of employees covered by the minimum wage and provision of certain employee benefits, specifically career breaks and worksharing and/or part-time work. With respect to the pay agreements information, 11 Only employers with more than three employees were surveyed and the data were collected at the enterprise level. While the NES was of enterprises with 3 plus employees, the results were calibrated to the Quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS) employment data for employees (excluding agriculture, forestry and fishing), which covers all employees. 12 The earnings information collected in the 2003 NES represents the gross monthly amount payable by the organisation to its employees, and relates to the month of March in 2003. This includes normal wages, salaries and overtime; taxable allowances, regular bonuses and commissions; and holiday or sick pay for the period in question. It does not include employer's Pay Related Social Insurance (PRSI), redundancy payments and back pay. 13 The "ownership" variable allows us to distinguish public and private sector organisations, and, inter alia, within the private sector between indigenously owned and subsidiaries of foreign companies.
employers were asked to indicate the proportion of their workforce covered by the following types of agreement:
Clearly, business, industry and national-level represent the various types of collective wage bargaining.
Employees were issued with a separate questionnaire within which they provided information on their age, gender, educational attainment, family status, employment status (part-time or full-time), length of time in paid employment, length of service with current employer and also other job-related characteristics (for example, trade union membership, shift-work, supervisory role, and flexi hours).
The dataset at hand does not allow an assessment of the impacts of bargaining agreements on individual-level earnings as we cannot be certain (below a 100 per cent threshold) that a specific form of wage bargaining covers an individual. Given this, the key aim of this paper is to assess the impact of institutional wage bargaining on firm-level average labour costs and wage inequality. To assess the impact of bargaining on average labour costs, we retain one observation per firm and derive a number of variables that we use to explain both average labour costs and wage dispersion. We apply establishment-level weights to these firm-level observations to ensure that our results are representative. Given that the NWA is the governing wage bargaining strategy used in the public sector in Ireland, suggesting little variation in this component of the data, the study is restricted to private sector firms. 
Results
The following section provides a descriptive assessment of the extent to which modes of wage bargaining vary by firm size, ownership (foreign versus indigenous) and sector.
The first column in Table 1 Perhaps, not surprisingly, individual-level bargaining is more heavily implemented by smaller firms, while collective bargaining arrangements, in particular the NWA are, on average, more heavily implemented by firms employing more than 50 workers.
These results suggest that the share of the workforce employed under the NWA (individual agreements) will be higher (lower) than the proportions reported in Table   1 .
With respect to sector, and adopting a similar interpretation as in Table 2 , Table 3 shows that individual-level bargaining is dominant in the Business Services and
Transport & Communications sectors, the NWA is somewhat over-represented in Manufacturing, while industry-level agreements are most important within the Construction sector.
Finally, Table 4 looks at the incidence of bargaining agreement by ownership type.
Interestingly, while the generally accepted view suggests that MNC's are more likely to adopt individual-level bargaining and are, therefore, less inclined towards collective forms of wage determination, the results suggest that the opposite is in fact the case in the Irish context. MNC's were found to be somewhat less likely to implement individual-level bargaining at the 70 per cent threshold, and were more likely to adopt the NWA and business-level agreements relative to indigenous firms.
Multivariate Analysis
Moving onto the econometric analysis, our specifications are based around the assumption that just as individual-level wages are primarily determined by the amount of human capital accumulated, average labour costs within the firm will be driven by the education profile of the workforce. Such factors are also important with respect to earnings inequality, as we would expect the distribution to be more dispersed in firms employing workers across a range of skill levels. Give this, we estimate the following:
where Y represents average firm labour costs, σ represents the coefficient of variation, H the mean human capital characteristics of the workforce, F firm-level characteristics, Bgn the form of wage bargaining adopted with a coverage rate at/or above a specified cut-off point and ε the error term. In terms of the human capital controls, where the individual-level information is based on a binary variable the firmlevel value is expressed as a share, otherwise an average value is included. The firmlevel controls included within the model relate to ownership type, trade union density, firm size, mode of production and sector.
Despite the earlier discussion, we are conscious of the fact that the method of wage bargaining may still be correlated, at least to some extent, with trade union density and the inclusion of this control in our model may serve to obscure the wage impacts of particular modes of bargaining. As a robustness check, we re-estimated the average labour cost models in a specification that excluded trade union density and the results hold. As an additional precautionary measure, we attempt to explicitly control for the possibility that our estimates could be prone to bias if the wage bargaining approach used is correlated with firm-level characteristics, such as trade union density, etc., that are in turn associated with higher/lower labour costs. To account for such effects we follow Card & De La Rica (2006) by including the predicted probability (i.e.
propensity scores) of adopting various forms of bargaining arrangements as controls within the firm-level regression.
We estimate our models at a series of cut-off points -70, 80 and 90 per cent -to control for the possibility that the impacts become more pronounced the higher the agreement coverage level within the firm. We ensure that the base case remains Perhaps, not surprisingly, the propensity score controls suggest that the NWA is more likely to be implemented in lower waged firms 16 . This finding that average labour costs are highest in firms not covered by collective bargaining arrangements suggests that, at least in the Irish Social Partnership context, the NWA acts as a benchmark for all other forms of collective bargaining as it constrains average pay growth within 15 Interestingly the union density effect has fallen in terms of significance in the adjusted regression, suggesting that this factor may have been affecting the collective bargaining variables in the OLS model. 16 To help ensure proper identification, we include two variables in our probit models, export intensity and share of employees working under flexible working arrangements, which are excluded from the wage equations. The coefficients and stand errors of the propensity score adjustments are presented in Table A1 in Appendix A.
such firms to a level below that of firms not covered by collective arrangements.
Regarding the other covariates, the coefficients all conform to expectations. Average labour costs were positively related with the education levels of the workforce, average experience, firm size, foreign ownership and trade union density and negatively correlated with the part-time employment share and the proportion of the workforce engaged in shift work. Finally, on the grounds that average labour cost impacts will reflect individual wage effects, Table 5 also suggests that individuals employed in firms where trade unions bargain directly with the employer do considerably better than those in similar firms where the trade union opts for wage bargaining through the NWA framework. Table 6 reports the results from the wage dispersion regressions. The models are again well specified with wage dispersion increasing with the share of educated labour, and higher in larger firms and those in the foreign-owned sector. As expected, within firm wage inequality was inversely related to levels of trade union density. In addition, the higher the proportion of the workforce made up of part-time and shift workers the lower the level of wage dispersion, reflecting the fact that wage levels will vary less in firms with high proportions of relatively low skilled workers. Even after controlling for the effects of trade union density, we still find that bargaining arrangements have differential impacts on the wage distribution. The results indicate that wage inequality is lower in firms implementing the NWA or industry-level agreements, providing further support for the view that collective bargaining arrangements reduce within firm levels of wage inequality. However, while the results are only significant at the 10 per cent level, they are relatively stable with respect to the extent of agreement coverage.
Given the importance of the foreign-owned sector in Ireland, and the hypothesis linking FDI and collective wage bargaining frameworks, we examine the extent to which wage bargaining has differential impacts within this sector by introducing a series of FDI interaction terms into our average labour cost and dispersion models.
The general assumption is that MNC's have a strong preference for a high degree of discretion regarding wage setting, which implies that they will tend not to locate in economies that have a heavily centralised wage bargaining system.
The results from the average labour cost equation are reported in Table 7 (2000) model.
To further investigate this issue, we estimated an Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition (Oaxaca, 1973; Blinder, 1973) , which allows us to assess the extent to which the labour cost differential between MNC's and indigenous firms is narrowed as a result of the NWA. The decomposition is standard and can be written as follows:
where LC represents average labour costs, IND is firms in the indigenous sector, X is a vector of all characteristics (human capital, bargaining regime and firm-level) determining labour costs, β is the return to these characteristics and α the intercept terms. The first term in the right-hand measures endowment effects i.e. the proportion of the gap attributable to characteristic differences, while the second term relates to coefficient effects i.e. difference returns to a given characteristic. We assume MNC's to represent the non-discriminatory regime on the grounds that labour costs are higher in this sector; however, our results stand when we take the indigenous sector as the base. Furthermore, when estimating detailed decomposition of this nature, we must be aware of the identification problem associated with the use of dummy variables where the number of categorical dummies exceeds one (Oaxaca & Ransom, 1999) . In this paper, pay bargaining regime and sector are both potentially affected by this identification issue. We have applied the approach developed by Gardeazabal & Ugidos (2004) to deal with this problem to the sector dummy variables in our model by estimating the decompositions imposing a normalising restriction 19 . However, due to the small number of MNC's implementing industry-level and other types of agreement, it was not possible to estimate the decomposition with the constraint imposed on the bargaining regime variables 20 . Consequently, we instead estimate the effects of bargaining regime using the original share values.
We can see from the results presented in Table 8 that the unadjusted average labour cost gap between MNC's and indigenous firms was 35.8 per cent, falling to 12.5 per cent once account was taken for differences in characteristics between both types of firms. Focussing on the impact on individual variables, the largest factor determining the cost gap is due to firms in the FDI sector being, on average, much larger in size. In addition, with respect to coefficient effects, the second major driver of the observed gap was the higher return to average experience in FDI firms. Most importantly, regarding bargaining regime, the results confirm that the adoption of the NWA among MNC's results in an average labour cost gap reduction of almost 6 per cent. In addition, the fact that individual-level agreements' tend to be more wage inflationary in the indigenous sector also serves to reduce the gap by a margin of just below 4 per cent. The analysis confirms our earlier assertion that the cost advantage to MNC's adopting the NWA exceeds that of indigenous firms. Finally, the analysis indicates that trade union density has a greater price effect on average labour costs among indigenous firms, which leads to a gap reduction of just over 2 per cent. 19 The normalisation of the restriction on the coefficients can be written as follows: . The implementation of this restriction leaves the other coefficients unaffected. With respect to wage dispersion, the results are presented in Table 9 and the interpretation of the coefficients are as before with indigenous firms implementing an arrange of agreements representing the base case. The analysis suggests that in the indigenous sector, within firm earnings inequality was significantly lower in firms implementing industry-level agreements and the NWA. In the FDI sector, dispersion was lowest in firms implementing an arrange of wage bargaining arrangements and those implementing industry or national-level agreements. Thus, the pattern regarding wage dispersion is somewhat more consistent across ownership categories. However, as all effects are relative to a base case, the results indicate that the distributional effects of collective bargaining through industry and national agreements on wage dispersion are stronger within indigenous firms.
Finally, the analysis shows that MNC's implementing a range of agreements are a somewhat unique category, as they have high average labour costs and relatively low levels of dispersion. This suggests that such firms may be concentrating on specialist high value added activities such as R&D. Consequently, the failure to separate out such firms within the OLS model serves to obscure the impacts of centralised bargaining on wage dispersion.
Summary and Conclusions
This paper examines the impact of various forms of wage bargaining on firm-level average labour costs and wage dispersion in private sector firms in Ireland. The results
show that average labour costs were higher in firms implementing individual agreements and business-level bargaining, and that the NWA exerted a largely neutral influence on labour costs. The finding that average labour costs are highest in firms implementing individual-level agreements suggests that Social Partnership constrains the pay demands of all forms of collective bargaining below that of the non-covered sector. The research also indicates that MNC's implementing the NWA have average labour costs that fall below those of other multinationals and many indigenous firms.
This result suggests that there are potentially large gains, in terms of competitiveness, to MNC's choosing to locate in countries implementing a centralised bargaining system.
On a more conventional note, the results show that within firm wage dispersion is lower in both MNC's and indigenous firms implementing the NWA or industry-level agreements. However, the wage compression impacts of collective bargaining were found to be more pronounced in the indigenous sector. The analysis adds further support to the view that collective bargaining reduces within firm wage inequality. Note: Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Sector controls included Note: Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Sector controls included Note: Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Sector controls included Note: Sector controls included Note: Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Sector controls included Appendix A 
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